Overview
SecureVote explores how an online election can protect both privacy and integrity: every vote can be checked, yet no one can link a ballot back to the voter who cast it.
Problem
Electronic voting has to prove that each eligible person voted once and that the count is correct, without ever revealing who voted for whom. Those goals pull against each other.
Research
The design is built on well-known primitives: RSA encryption, blind signatures, an anonymizing channel and a two-code identification scheme, with separate roles for the voter, the administrator who signs ballots and the counter authority.
Design Process
A clear, terminal-inspired interface walks the voter through four steps (identify, vote, confirm, submit) with a dedicated page to verify a receipt and another for the results. Status indicators show the system and the anonymizer are online.
Development
A React front end encrypts the choice on the client and a Python back end handles eligibility checks, blind signing, anonymized routing, encrypted storage and counting. The identification codes are never stored in plaintext.
Challenges
Keeping identity and ballot completely unlinked while still preventing double voting and letting each voter verify that their own vote was counted.
Solution
The ballot is blinded before the administrator signs it, so the signer never sees its content. It then travels through the anonymizer and is stored encrypted, and only the counter authority can tally the votes. The voter keeps a receipt to verify their vote later.
Results
A live academic prototype that turns applied cryptography into a working full-stack application. It shows security engineering, protocol design and the ability to connect a React interface to a Python back end. It is a study build, not meant for real elections.